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The  Carbon Disclosure Proj-
ect, a  nonprofi t that tracks 
fi rms’ emission reductions 
 around the world, recently 
compared  the eff orts of 
the FTSE 100—the United 
King dom’s big gest blue-chip 
 companies, aff ectionately 
called “Footsie”—with the 
government goal of a 34% to 
42% reduction (against a 1990 
baseline) by 2020.
The good news: These 
companies are aiming for , 
on average, a 2.5% annual re-
duction, and 2.4%  is needed 
to hit the 2020 target. The 
less-than-good news: The 24 
fi rms in the energy, utilities, 
and materials sector are 
responsible for 87% of all 
Footsie emissions. And their 
annual reduction targets 
average 1.2%—which will 
make them miss the deadline 
by more than a decade . 
While praising many 
com panies’ initial reduction 
targets and transparency, the 
CDP calls on energy, utilities, 
and materials to set more-
aggressive goals . It says that 
“radical change is required in 
this sector.” 
Andrew Burke is a professor at the 
Cranfi eld School of Management. André 
van Stel is a senior researcher at EIM Business 
and Policy Research. Roy Thurik is a professor at 
Erasmus University. For more about their 
research, go to ssrn.com/abstract=1417221.
A re you a fi ve-forces  disciple or a blue-ocean enthusiast? That is, do you try to dominate existing 
markets or look for opportunities to cre-
ate new ones? Both approaches to strategy 
have their devotees, but to the best of our 
knowledge, no one before now has con-
ducted an empirical study comparing the 
two camps. 
So we did. For our research framework, 
we used a model that dates back to a semi-
nal 1921 economics paper by Harold Hotell-
ing. It posits that as long as there are prof-
its to be had in a particular market, more 
and more vendors will arrive to serve that 
market until it reaches a saturation point, 
where everyone more or less breaks even.   
Looking at entire industries in this way 
allows you to tell over time whether an in-
novation strategy or a competitive strategy 
is best. Of course, the blue-ocean approach 
to this model would call for creating a new 
market. If that attracted consumers over 
the long term, industry profits and the 
number of vendors would both steadily in-
crease—and you could conclude that com-
panies succeed by staking out new markets. 
If, however, fi rm profi tability went down as 
the number of fi rms went up , you’d know 
that the scope of new opportunities was 
limited or that the barriers to following the 
trailblazer were very low. Either way in that 
scenario, companies focused on competi-
tion would outperform those setting their 
sights on blue oceans. 
We tested the model on Dutch retailing. 
(Although one study doesn’t constitute 
proof , this industry provides a good lab 
because it has shown signs of being both 
highly competitive and markedly innova-
tive over the past two decades .) Its frequent 
new-brand introductions and widespread 
use of differentiation strategies have led 
to increased market segmentation, deeper 
and broader markets, and the rejuvenation 
of “tired” sectors such as hardware stores. 
We looked at profits and numbers of 
vendors for 41 shop types over a 19 -year pe-
riod (1982–2000). In 2000 these shop types 
accounted for some 83% of all Dutch retail 
stores and about 90% of the industry’s rev-
enue  and employment. We were surprised 
to fi nd evidence that blue-ocean strategy 
is sustainable. In more than half the shop 
types, average fi rm profi ts and the number 
of fi rms were positively related. And more 
important, after controlling for extraneous 
factors such as business-cycle eff ects, we 
discovered across all types that average 
firm profitability and the number of ven-
dors rose and fell together over the period. 
Of course, it would be foolish to dis-
miss competitive strategy altogether.  Our 
research shows that competition eventu-
ally erodes the profi ts from innovation. But 
that’s a slow process, requiring 15 years or 
so, which suggests that it takes the better 
part of a generation for the blue-ocean ap-
proach to yield to competitive strategy. 
All this indicates that businesses may 
want to consider a blend of the two ap-
proaches.  For instance, by slowing down 
profit erosion with an effective competi-
tive strategy for an existing market, they 
can increase the funds available for blue-
ocean investments and thus their chances 
of fi nding an untapped market with plenty 
of consumers.   HBR Reprint F1005D
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